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Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s 45 – request for information – whether the 
statutory obligations continue after commencement of proceedings 
 
In Angus v Conelius [2007] QCA 190 the Queensland Court of Appeal concluded that 
the obligations under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (“the Act”), and in 
particular s 45 of the Act (duty of claimant to cooperate with insurer), continue 
beyond the commencement of court proceedings. 
 
Facts 
 
The appellant was the plaintiff in proceedings which were commenced in the Supreme 
Court in October 2004. The action concerned a motor vehicle accident which 
happened on 21 July 2001. Consent orders had been made under s 51A(5) of the Act, 
permitting the appellant to bring proceedings before the compulsory conference 
required by s 51A was held, and making other orders.  
 
A compulsory conference was held in July 2005. Mandatory final offers were 
exchanged and the claim and statement of claim were served on 2 August 2005. The 
notice of intention to defend and defence was filed on 15 August 2005. The 
appellant’s statement of loss and damage was served on 19 September 2005, and a 
mediation conducted on 7 December 2005. 
 
In September 2004, apparently in response to a request by the respondent under s 45 
of the Act, the appellant had provided a document describing her economic loss in the 
same terms as the statement of loss and damage filed after the compulsory conference.  
 
In March 2006 the respondent’s solicitor forwarded a letter to the appellant’s solicitor 
seeking information under s 45 of the Act (Duty of claimant to cooperate with 
insurer). The request sought a range of details relating to the appellant’s past and 
future economic loss claims.  
 
The request was declined. In September 2006 the respondent applied for orders under 
s 50 of the Act that the appellant provide its solicitors with the information requested 
under s 45. This order was made on 17 November 2006. The appellant applied to the 
Court of Appeal for an extension of time within which to appeal, and brought an 
appeal against the order of November 17. 
 
Issue 
 
It was not contended that the information sought was not relevant to the claim made 
for economic loss, and to any reasonable assessment of the strength of that claim. It 
was argued, however, that the primary judge was wrong in the conclusion that the 
provisions of s 45 of the Act applied to the appellant in the circumstances.  
 
It was submitted that the provisions of the Act appeared to be expressly directed to the 
pre-litigation resolution of claims and that once an action was instituted the provisions 
of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) should apply, so that the 
appropriate course was for the respondent to obtain leave under those rules to 
interrogate the plaintiff. The issue was whether in the circumstances the respondent 
was still entitled to make a request under s 45 of the Act. 
 
Analysis  
 
The leading judgment was delivered by Jerrard JA. His Honour noted that none of the 
provisions in Division 3 of the Act, including sections 45 and 47 (which imposes a 
similar duty upon an insurer to co-operate with the claimant), are expressed to be 
inapplicable once proceedings are brought based on the claim. 
 
His Honour could find no obvious reason why the rights and obligations given by 
those sections should end at the compulsory conference. He noted that the obligation 
imposed on a claimant by s 45(3) expressly continued until the claim was “resolved”.  
 
As this resolution could be by agreement or by judgment, he said there was a 
contextual implication the obligations continued after proceedings have begun in 
court.  
 
He also referred to s 50 of the Act (Court’s power to enforce compliance with divs 2, 
3 and 4) and noted it specifically extended to a court before which a proceeding has 
already been brought, and found this too to be inconsistent with the essential 
argument advanced by the appellant. 
 
Jerrard JA concluded that the obligations imposed under s 45 and s 47 of the Act all 
continue as described in Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd v Hill [2004] 2 QdR 681 at 
688, namely that: “Those obligations respectively imposed by ss 45 and 47 would last 
until settlement of the claim or determination of it by judgment.” 
 
It was conceded that, in appropriate circumstances, a judge will have a discretion to 
decline to order that answers be given. This would be expected if, for example, a court 
concluded that questions were being asked as a “stalling tactic” or for an improper 
purpose, or if the questions were asked very late – such as after a claimant gave 
evidence. Jerrard JA was satisfied the judge at first instance was correct in the view 
that there was nothing in the instant circumstances to give rise to a discretion to order 
against answering. 
 
Williams JA and Atkinson J both agreed with the reasons of Jerrard JA, and added 
brief observations. Williams J found the provisions in Part 4 of the Act to be 
complementary to the UCPR and said that the fact that an insurer-defendant after 
proceedings had commenced in a court could obtain the information in question from 
the claimant-plaintiff either by relying on the provisions of the Act or the rules does 
not create a problem which requires the court to conclude that the legislative intention 
must have been that only one of those two available procedures was intended to be 
operative at that stage.  
 
In the course of her additional comments Atkinson J noted that the duty in s 45 is 
conditioned upon the request being reasonably made, but found the fact that a request 
is made after the compulsory conference was not itself sufficient to conclude that the 
information was not reasonably requested.  
 
Order 
 
The application for an extension of time for the appeal was allowed, but the appeal 
was then dismissed with costs. 
 
Comment 
 
The ability for either party to continue to rely on the Act to obtain relevant 
information from an opponent, despite the commencement of court proceedings, may 
prove a useful and cost-effective alternative to the procedures under the UCPR.  
 
As the facts in this case illustrate, a party may be able to obtain information without 
the necessity for a court application, as may otherwise be required. 
 
It must be remembered, however, that the court’s power in s 50 of the Act to compel 
compliance with the obligations imposed under the Act is discretionary. In this case 
the respondent had been provided with information relating to the appellant’s claim 
for economic loss some 10 months before the compulsory conference. Given the 
timing of the subsequent request for information the respondent might fairly be 
regarded as fortunate that the court declined to exercise its discretion to refuse to 
require that answers be given.  
 
The judgment of Jerrard JA provides some examples of circumstances in which the 
court would certainly be expected to use its discretion to decline to make the order 
sought. No doubt there will be a range of others in which it may be concluded that 
information sought after the commencement of proceedings (and particularly long 
after the commencement of proceedings) is not “reasonably requested” under s 45.  
 
Consistent with the spirit of the Act parties’ legal representatives should consider their 
clients’ positions at an early stage, and in the ordinary course information which may 
be required under the Act should be requested at the earliest opportunity, and both 
provided and evaluated prior to the compulsory conference.  
